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1 
CO-WORKER EVIDENCE IN COURT 
SANDRA F. SPERINO* 
ABSTRACT 
This symposium explores ways to empower workers. Many employment laws 
rely on workers filing private rights of action to enforce the underlying 
substantive law. Unfortunately, when workers file these claims in court, courts 
often do not allow them to rely on evidence from their co-workers. While courts 
regularly allow employers to submit co-worker evidence of a plaintiff’s poor 
performance or lack of qualifications, they often diminish or exclude a plaintiff’s 
co-worker evidence that the plaintiff performed well or possessed desired 
qualifications. This Article identifies and explores this evidentiary inequality. It 
argues that efforts to empower workers must include the power to support one 
another in litigation and that courts should be careful about rejecting plaintiffs’ 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In discrimination cases, both employers and workers try to rely on evidence 
from co-workers. Employers often use co-worker evidence to support their 
litigation narrative. Workers try to rely on co-worker testimony to show 
discrimination. It would be logical to assume that this evidence would be treated 
the same way by courts, but this is not the case. Courts often allow employers to 
use co-worker evidence to defend a case, while excluding or diminishing similar 
evidence offered to support a worker’s case. 
This evidentiary inequality occurs frequently when the parties dispute 
whether the plaintiff performed her job well or whether she was qualified for a 
new job or a promotion. Courts will often allow the employer to offer evidence 
from co-workers that the plaintiff engaged in misconduct, performed her work 
poorly, or was not qualified. At the same time, courts often exclude or diminish 
evidence from co-workers that shows the plaintiff did not engage in the alleged 
misconduct, performed her work well, or was qualified for the contested job.1 
This Article provides a comprehensive picture of how the courts view co-
worker evidence related to worker performance and qualifications. It documents 
the existing evidentiary inequality.2 This evidentiary inequality related to co-
worker evidence is relatively well hidden for several reasons.  
First, there is no single, overarching evidentiary doctrine related to co-
worker evidence. Courts exclude or include co-worker evidence through several 
doctrines, which facially appear to be disconnected. At times, no doctrine is at 
play, and the evidentiary equality only emerges by analyzing the conclusions 
courts reach about particular evidence offered by the parties.  
Second, courts do not always identify people using generic words like co-
worker or supervisor. Instead, they often use titles that are specific to the 
particular employer or refer to workers with their names. Finding the evidentiary 
inequality often means reading the facts of each case in detail to determine each 
person’s status in relation to the underlying facts.  
Third, in some cases, it is nearly impossible to tell what evidence the 
plaintiff actually offered because the courts only generally describe the 
evidence. For example, a court might state that the plaintiff submitted a 
particular person’s “opinion” about the plaintiff’s performance without 
describing in detail who the co-worker is and the subject of the co-worker’s 
testimony.3 The only way to see the pattern is to read the facts of hundreds of 
cases to determine from whom the worker or the employer obtained evidence 
and what evidence each party presented to the court. 
 
 1. See cases cited in Section II, infra. 
 2. This Article is part of a larger project to explore this problem. See Sandra F. Sperino, 
Evidentiary Inequality (manuscript on file with the author). 
 3. Brice v. Joule Inc., No. 00-1068, 2000 WL 1225542, at *2 (4th Cir. July 31, 2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2020] CO-WORKER EVIDENCE IN COURT 3 
Finally, the evidentiary inequality related to co-worker evidence is not 
uniform. The concept analyzed in this Article is a propensity and not a universal 
norm. Counterexamples abound.4 Nonetheless, the overall trajectory of the cases 
favors employers and not workers. 
Importantly, judges may not be aware of the differing ways the judiciary as 
a whole is treating co-worker evidence. In many cases, a judge will have co-
worker evidence from one party, but not the other. Thus, in any given case, an 
individual judge may not see how co-worker evidence is being treated 
differently, even if that particular judge treats co-worker evidence differently 
across multiple cases.  
This Article advocates for more transparency related to co-worker evidence, 
especially in the summary judgment context. At the summary judgment stage, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct judges to make all reasonable 
inferences from a given fact in favor of the non-moving party.5 Judges routinely 
make inferences against the plaintiff when the employer moves for summary 
judgment. Not only are judges routinely making inferences against the worker 
(the non-moving party) at summary judgment, they are also failing to apply the 
same inferences to the employer’s evidence that they apply to the worker’s 
evidence. In many cases judges will cite the summary judgment standard early 
in their opinion, and the standard performs little to no work as the judges analyze 
the cases before them. 
One way to effectuate transparency is to infuse employment discrimination 
law with a statement rule identifying the propensity and requiring judges to 
reflect about whether they treat evidence appropriately. At the summary 
judgment stage, the statement rule would reiterate the appropriate legal standard, 
emphasizing in which party’s favor inferences should be drawn. It would 
discourage judges from excluding or diminishing the plaintiff’s evidence at the 
summary judgment stage, except in limited circumstances.6 For each piece of 
evidence that favors the plaintiff, the statement rule could require the district 
court to fully describe the plaintiff’s evidence. If the judge excludes or 
diminishes the evidence, the statement rule would require the court to explain 
how its decision is consistent with the procedural juncture of the case. Similarly, 
 
 4. See, e.g., Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558, 570 (6th Cir. 2019) (relying on 
co-worker testimony that some of disciplinary writeups were unjustified); Rogers v. Medline 
Indus., Inc., No. 1:17CV118-HSO-RHW, 2019 WL 402361, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 31, 2019) 
(allowing evidence of past good and bad performance). The purpose of this article is not to criticize 
the outcomes in specific cases. Instead, it is to demonstrate a propensity of courts to allow co-
worker evidence when it favors the employer and to disfavor similar evidence when it favors the 
plaintiff. As with almost everything else in discrimination law, counterexamples abound. 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 6. See Sandra F. Sperino, Evidentiary Inequality (manuscript on file with the author). For 
example, an affidavit submitted in favor of the plaintiff might be excluded if the information 
contained within it is not based on personal knowledge. 
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if the judge draws inferences in favor of the defendant, it should be required to 
justify why such inferences comport with the summary judgment standard. 
Section II discusses the federal discrimination statutes, common evidentiary 
paths parties use to prove or defend discrimination claims, and the role of 
summary judgment in them. Section III shows how courts regularly allow 
defendants to rely on co-worker evidence, but do not allow plaintiffs to rely on 
similar evidence. Section IV advocates a path forward that recognizes the 
evidentiary inequality and requires courts to transparently reconcile their views 
on co-worker evidence with the discrimination statutes’ right to jury trial and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II.  THE DISCRIMINATION STATUTES, RECURRING EVIDENTIARY PATHS, AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The Discrimination Statutes 
Federal employment discrimination law is primarily grounded in four 
statutes: Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.7 Title VII is the 
cornerstone federal employment discrimination statute. Title VII prohibits an 
employer from discriminating against a worker because of race, sex, national 
origin, color, or religion.8 Title VII’s main operative provision consists of two 
subparts. Under the first subpart, it is an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to do the following: “(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”9 Under Title 
VII’s second subpart, it is unlawful for an employer to do the following: 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.10 
These two subparts form the foundation of Title VII’s text.11 The ADEA 
contains similar main language,12 and the ADA contains similar concepts, 
 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2010) (Title VII’s primary operative provisions); 29 U.S.C. § 
623(a) (2006) (same for ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) & (b) (2009) (same for ADA). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 11. Congress amended Title VII in 1991. However, this does not change the fact that the 
foundational text of Title VII is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). 
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although not always stated in the same language.13 Section 1981 does not use 
similar language; however, the courts have often used the same frameworks to 
analyze disparate treatment claims under section 1981 and Title VII.14 Under 
each of these statutory regimes, a plaintiff has a right to jury trial under certain 
circumstances.15 
Under the federal discrimination statutes, a plaintiff often tries to prove that 
the employer took certain actions “because of” an individual’s protected trait, 
such as race, sex, or age.16 Although there are many different ways for a plaintiff 
to make this showing, many plaintiffs proceed under an individual disparate 
treatment theory. In individual disparate treatment cases, a plaintiff or a small 
group of plaintiffs tries to show that an employer took a negative action against 
them because of their protected trait.17 Although the statutes do not require proof 
of intent or animus, plaintiffs proceeding on a disparate treatment theory often 
rely on such evidence.  
This Article will focus on disparate treatment cases because plaintiffs 
frequently proceed under this theory of discrimination. The courts have created 
a series of frameworks to evaluate disparate treatment cases. These frameworks 
are not contained within the discrimination statutes but play an important role in 
how courts analyze discrimination cases. If a plaintiff proceeds under a disparate 
treatment theory, many courts will analyze the case by first determining the type 
of evidence the plaintiff possesses, often dividing that evidence between what 
the courts call “direct evidence” and “circumstantial evidence.”18 
 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. 
 14. See, e.g., Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1056 (8th Cir. 1997); but see Comcast 
v. Nat’l Ass’n of African-American Owned Media, 589 U.S. 1,1 (2020) (holding that a plaintiff is 
required to establish “but for” cause in Section 1981 cases). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (2006). Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury 
trial in all instances. For example, a jury trial is not available for disparate impact claims under 
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (c). The ADEA’s federal sector provision does not provide a jury 
trial. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 168 (1981); Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 
U.S. 338, 357 (2013). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). The ADA uses slightly different causal 
language and describes in greater detail how disability discrimination might occur. 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(a) & (b). Section 1981 does not use similar language; however, the courts have often used 
the same frameworks to analyze claims under section 1981 and Title VII. See, e.g., Kim, 123 F.3d 
at1056; but see Comcast, 589 U.S. at 1 (holding a plaintiff is required to establish “but for” cause 
in Section 1981 cases). 
 17. See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and 
the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009) (comparing 
disparate treatment with other theories). 
 18. See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69 
(2011) (providing an overview and critique of the frameworks); see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92–93 (2003) (rejecting the difference between direct and circumstantial 
evidence in certain Title VII cases); Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(critiquing the rigid use of frameworks). 
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When evaluating discrimination cases, a plaintiff can prevail by presenting 
direct evidence that her protected trait caused an outcome. Direct evidence is 
evidence that proves discrimination without inference.19 For example, if a 
supervisor told a woman that he did not promote her because women do not 
make good managers, this would be direct evidence of discrimination. The 
supervisor’s statement directly connects the plaintiff’s sex with the negative 
outcome. The employer will be liable for employment discrimination, unless a 
defense or affirmative defense applies.  
In contrast, circumstantial evidence relies on inferences.20 Most modern 
discrimination cases rely on circumstantial evidence of discrimination. The 
courts often use the McDonnell Douglas framework to evaluate disparate 
treatment cases with circumstantial evidence.21 McDonnell Douglas is a three-
part, burden-shifting framework.22 It is one way to establish a discrimination 
claim. 
The test begins with a multipart first step, called the prima facie case. In the 
McDonnell Douglas case itself, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could 
establish the prima facie case by: 
[s]howing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, 
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the 
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from 
persons of complainant’s qualifications.23  
The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the facts required to establish a 
prima facie case will necessarily vary, depending on the factual scenario of the 
underlying case.24 The Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that 
the prima facie case is not supposed to be onerous.25 
After the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption 
of discrimination arises.26 The analysis then proceeds to the second step of 
McDonnell Douglas. After a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden 
shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
 
 19. See, e.g., Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see also 
Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 703 F.3d 911, 914–15 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 20. See, e.g., Caskey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 535 F.3d 585, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). 
 22. For in-depth treatment of this framework, see Sandra F. Sperino, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: 
THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN DISCRIMINATION LAW (Bloomberg). 
 23. McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015); Texas Dep’t 
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
 26. O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1996). 
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for the allegedly discriminatory decision or action, thereby rebutting the 
presumption.27 If the employer does this, the inquiry proceeds to the third step. 
In the third step, the plaintiff may prevail by showing that the employer’s 
stated reason is pretext or by producing other evidence to establish the employer 
took the negative action because of a protected trait.28 If the plaintiff establishes 
pretext, a factfinder may infer from the evidence of pretext that the employer 
discriminated because of a protected trait. In the third step, the plaintiff may 
succeed “by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence.”29 As one court noted,  
the plaintiff may attempt to meet this burden with (1) evidence establishing her 
prima facie case; (2) evidence attacking the employer’s proffered explanation; 
and (3) any further evidence that may be available to the plaintiff, “such as 
independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the 
employer.”30  
Some courts primarily rely on the direct evidence method or the McDonnell 
Douglas framework to evaluate disparate treatment cases.31 Some courts have 
expressed concern that the proof structure dichotomy encourages courts to view 
the plaintiff’s case in a piecemeal fashion, rather than as a coherent whole.32 In 
Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., the Seventh Circuit worried that the trial court 
judge first separated direct evidence and indirect evidence, then evaluated only 
the direct evidence under the direct evidence framework and viewed the indirect 
evidence through McDonnell Douglas. By doing this, the trial court failed to 
determine whether the combined direct evidence and circumstantial evidence 
might establish that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff. The 
Seventh Circuit noted that the legal standard for proving an individual disparate 
treatment case, 
is simply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude 
that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused 
the discharge or other adverse employment action. Evidence must be considered 
as a whole, rather than asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves 
the case by itself—or whether just the “direct” evidence does so, or the “indirect” 
evidence. Evidence is evidence. Relevant evidence must be considered and 
 
 27. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802. 
 28. Id. at 804. 
 29. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 256. 
 30. Simpson v. Leavitt, 437 F. Supp. 2d 95, 101 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 31. Rodriguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 820 F.3d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Henry v. 
Spectrum, L.L.C., 793 F. App’x 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2019); Grose v. Mnuchin, No. 18-5746, 2019 
WL 7603383, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 2019); Gress v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., 784 F. App’x 
100, 104 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 32. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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irrelevant evidence disregarded, but no evidence should be treated differently 
from other evidence because it can be labeled “direct” or “indirect.”33 
B. A Recurring Evidentiary Path 
A plaintiff can try to establish discrimination through a variety of 
evidentiary paths, and employers similarly may defend cases through various 
forms of evidence. Although there is not one predominant set of evidence that 
workers and employers invoke in discrimination cases, cases often rely on 
evidence related to the plaintiff’s work performance or qualifications. In some 
cases, the performance and qualifications of other similarly situated workers is 
relevant. This evidence is often contested by the parties. 
This evidence can play a role at each stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis. In many cases, a plaintiff establishes the fourth factor of the prima facie 
case by showing comparator evidence: that the employer treated her differently 
than other similarly situated workers outside her protected class.34 Comparator 
evidence plays a prominent role in discrimination cases. If a factfinder believes 
that the employer treated a person differently because of a protected trait, this 
evidence alone can establish discrimination. Employers will often contend that 
a plaintiff cannot establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case because the 
plaintiff cannot present evidence of a similarly situated employee that the 
employer treated differently.35 Comparator evidence relies heavily on evaluating 
the plaintiff’s job performance, qualifications, or misconduct with that of other 
employees.  
At the second step of McDonnell Douglas, the employer presents a non-
discriminatory reason to justify its action against the plaintiff. Employers often 
defend cases by presenting evidence of the plaintiff’s poor performance, 
misconduct, or lack of qualifications. 
The central insight from McDonnell Douglas is that a plaintiff can establish 
discrimination by showing that an employer’s articulated reason for its action 
 
 33. Id. at 765. 
 34. See, e.g., Tukay v. United Airlines, Inc., 708 F. App’x 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2018); McKinney 
v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cty., 866 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2017). For a critique of this 
doctrine, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 761 (2011). 
 35. A plaintiff is not required to establish a similarly situated comparator to establish the prima 
facie case. The federal circuits employ various tests to determine whether a party can rely on 
comparator evidence. The Seventh Circuit has noted that the plaintiff and the comparator “need not 
be identical in every conceivable way”; rather, they must be “‘directly comparable’ to the plaintiff 
‘in all material respects.’” Skiba v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 723 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012)). The Sixth Circuit has stated that 
comparators must be “nearly identical.” Brown v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 
Cty., 722 F. App’x 520, 527–28 (6th Cir. 2018). However, the Sixth Circuit has also reasoned: 
“plaintiff need not demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee receiving more favorable 
treatment.” Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998). For 
purposes of this Article, the particular test used by the circuit is not important. 
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was a pretext for discrimination.36 In other words, an employee is not required 
to produce “smoking gun” evidence to prove discrimination. Instead, a plaintiff 
might be able to prevail if the employer’s reasons for its action do not make 
sense, are not credible, or otherwise seem fishy. A plaintiff can use comparator 
evidence to establish that the employer’s reason is pretextual. An employer may 
counter plaintiff’s pretext evidence by showing that it treated other employees 
similarly.37  
For example, if an employer fires an older worker for missing work three 
times but does not fire a younger worker with the same number of absences, a 
factfinder might conclude that the employer fired the older worker because of 
her age. Similarly, an employer might offer comparator evidence to help 
establish that it did not discriminate against the worker. In our example, if the 
employer fired a younger employee for missing three days of work and also fired 
an older worker for missing three days of work, the employer might offer this 
evidence of similar treatment to establish that it did not discriminate. Both 
plaintiffs and employers rely on comparator evidence in discrimination cases, 
and this comparator evidence often depends on evidence related to the work 
performance of the plaintiff and other workers.38  
Evidence from co-workers may be useful to both the plaintiff and the 
employer. Co-workers often possess information about evidence related to the 
plaintiff’s work performance and the performance of other similarly situated 
workers; whether the employer had a particular policy and consistently enforced 
it; and whether the plaintiff or others possessed certain traits or skills.  
Before continuing, a brief terminology note is necessary. In discrimination 
cases, courts often draw a line between the actions of supervisors and the actions 
of non-supervisors. In Vance v. Ball State University, the Supreme Court defined 
the term “supervisor.”39 The Court held that an employee is a “supervisor” for 
purposes of agency analysis when the person has the power to take a tangible 
employment action against the complaining employee.40 Tangible employment 
 
 36. 411 U.S. at 804. In McDonnell Douglas itself, the Court noted that the facts required to 
prove a prima facie case will necessarily vary, depending on the case. Id. at 802 n.13. In subsequent 
cases, the Court further considered how the McDonnell Douglas test would operate. Texas Dep’t 
of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253; St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). 
 37. Comparator evidence may be used in other ways. For example, under Title VII, an 
employer can reduce its damages if it can show it would have made the same decision even if it did 
not consider the protected trait. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2) (2010). Comparator 
evidence may help the employer establish this affirmative defense. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2) (2006). 
 39. 570 U.S. 421, 431 (2013). 
 40. Id. at 431. In dicta, the Court also noted that employers might try to insulate themselves 
against automatic liability by vesting the authority to make tangible employment actions to only a 
narrow band of employees “Under those circumstances, the employer may be held to have 
effectively delegated the power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose 
recommendations it relies.” Id. at 447. 
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action means to effect a “significant change in employment status, such as 
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”41 Courts 
often refer to non-supervisors as co-workers, even though using the word “co-
worker” in this sense is confusing because it is not fully consistent with how 
many people use the term. In a colloquial sense, the word co-worker often means 
that two workers share a similar role or level within the larger organization. 
When this Article uses the term co-worker, it means it in the legal sense of 
the word as it is used in modern, employment discrimination cases. A co-worker 
is any person who cannot take a tangible employment action against an 
employee. Examples of people who might fall within this way of defining “co-
worker” include, among others, the plaintiff’s peers, the plaintiff’s subordinates, 
the plaintiff’s former supervisors, and human resource employees who cannot 
take tangible employment actions.42  
C. Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is an important procedural juncture in many 
discrimination cases. Litigants have a right to a jury trial under the federal 
discrimination statutes, at least under certain circumstances.43 Under the federal 
rule governing summary judgment, a claim may be dismissed only if no 
reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.44 In most 
employment discrimination cases, the employer is the entity requesting 
summary judgment. In such cases, the judge is supposed to assume the evidence 
that the plaintiff presents is true and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the worker.45 Any disputed facts are read in the plaintiff’s favor for purposes 
of summary judgment. Most of the time when judges rule on summary judgment 
motions, they rule on a paper record and never actually see or hear the parties’ 
witnesses.  
In some cases, a judicial grant of summary judgment in the employer’s favor 
is not controversial. For example, if the plaintiff does not timely file her 
discrimination claim, it would be appropriate for the court to grant summary 
 
 41. Id. at 431. 
 42. It is not necessary here to determine whether a supervisor also includes those to whom the 
employer has effectively delegated authority, even when it has not officially granted it. Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761–62 (1998).  
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c). Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial in all 
instances. For example, a jury trial is not available for disparate impact claims under Title VII. 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (c). The ADEA’s federal sector provision does not provide a jury trial. Lehman 
v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 168 (1981); Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 357 
(2013). 
 44. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 45. See, e.g., Blue v. Lopez, 901 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018). 
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judgment. The plaintiff does not technically possess a claim, and having a jury 
decide that fact is not necessary.  
In many cases, however, the parties heavily contest the facts. Congress has 
decided that the proper entity to resolve these factual disputes in intentional 
discrimination cases is the jury. Some judges have emphasized the importance 
of allowing cases go to trial when the parties contest the facts because judges 
usually live “in a narrow segment of the enormously broad American socio-
economic spectrum,” and they generally lack “current real-life experience.”46 
They emphasize how employment discrimination cases “are factually complex, 
deal with state-of-mind issues, are typically proved circumstantially, and are 
rarely uncontested.”47 
The practice of summary judgment in federal court often does not comport 
with the ground rules established in Rule 56 or with Congress’s expressed desire 
that plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial.48 Instead, many judges are making 
powerful choices in how they view the evidence submitted by the parties. They 
often permit defendants to rely on evidence from co-workers when the evidence 
supports the defense. However, they often exclude or diminish the importance 
of co-worker evidence when the evidence would support the plaintiff’s case. 
III.  CO-WORKER EVIDENCE 
Courts often allow employers to present co-worker evidence to support their 
case. However, they often diminish or refuse to consider similar co-worker 
evidence when plaintiffs offer the co-worker evidence to support their cases. 
A. Co-Worker Evidence for Employers 
Unsurprisingly, courts regularly allow employers to use co-worker 
testimony to support the employer’s claim that plaintiffs engaged in misconduct, 
performed their work poorly, or did not possess the necessary skills for a 
particular job. Courts allow employers to offer evidence of a plaintiff’s mistakes 
or poor job performance from prior supervisors.49 Courts also regularly allow 
 
 46. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342–43 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 47. Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 113 (2012). 
 48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 49. See, e.g., Seastrand v. U.S. Bank N.A., No. 19-4091, 2020 WL 1909065, at *3 (10th Cir. 
Apr. 20, 2020) (allowing evidence from former supervisor of plaintiff’s poor judgment); Sims v. 
MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013); Moorer v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Sys., 398 
F.3d 469, 490 (6th Cir. 2005) (relying on a memorandum that described plaintiff’s prior work 
deficiencies); Ralser v. Hudson Grp. (HG) Retail, LLC, No. CV 19-1359, 2020 WL 94878, at *9 
(E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2020) (noting unfavorable performance review by the plaintiff’s former 
supervisor); Robertson v. Riverstone Communities, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-2668-CAP-JKL, 2019 WL 
4399492, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 28, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-
02668-CAP, 2019 WL 3282991 (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2019) (discussing performance review from 
former supervisor); Nagpal v. Holder, 750 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2010) (relying on reviews 
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employers to rely on evidence of plaintiff’s poor performance or misconduct 
from non-supervisory co-workers.50 Courts regularly consider plaintiff’s past 
performance reviews when offered by the employer to establish the plaintiff’s 
poor performance or lack of skills or qualifications.51 
In many instances, the courts appear to allow a supervisor or other employee 
to present affidavits or other documents conveying the thoughts or opinions of 
co-workers.52 Courts routinely allow employers to offer co-worker evidence 
about poor performance or misconduct through the testimony of supervisors.53 
For example, in one case, the court allowed a supervisor to present an affidavit 
that “[she] heard numerous staff members complain that [the plaintiff] was lazy, 
not performing her work and that she continuously made errors”54 
Courts rely on co-worker evidence even when that evidence or the way that 
the court describes the evidence is vague about what happened. For example, 
courts allow co-worker evidence about the general perceived conduct or 
 
from multiple prior supervisors and many not related to challenged action); Ratcliff v. Exxonmobil 
Corp., No. CIV.A. 01-2618, 2002 WL 1315625, at *5 (E.D. La. June 13, 2002) (stating that hiring 
decisionmakers relied on opinions of plaintiff’s former supervisors). 
 50. Gant v. Genco I, Inc., 274 F. App’x 429, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting numerous complaints 
from co-workers); Vasser v. SaarGummi Tennessee, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-00083, 2019 WL 
8013869, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-CV-
00083, 2020 WL 428941 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2020) (noting complaints from co-workers); Jeffrey 
v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., No. CV 17-0531, 2019 WL 2122989, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 
14, 2019); Clark v. New York State Office of State Comptroller, No. 1:09-CV-716 GLS/CFH, 2014 
WL 823289, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014) (noting numerous complaints from co-workers); 
Bielich v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 589, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (relying on co-worker 
and customer complaints); Georgy v. O’Neill, No. 00-CV-0660(FB), 2002 WL 449723, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2002) (co-worker complaints). 
 51. See, e.g., Ralser v. Hudson Grp. (HG) Retail, LLC, No. CV 19-1359, 2020 WL 94878, at 
*9 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2020) (noting unfavorable performance review by the plaintiff’s former 
supervisor); Nagpal, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 27 (relying on reviews from multiple prior supervisors and 
many not related to challenged action). 
 52. Moorer, 398 F.3d at 490 (discussing a memorandum about the plaintiff’s job deficiencies 
including customer complaints and staff communication issues); Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 
F.3d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 1998) (allowing corporate decisionmakers to file affidavits about what they 
had been told about the plaintiff from unnamed employees); Vasser, No. 1:18-CV-00083, 2019 WL 
8013869, at *3 (noting complaints from co-workers). In addition, in many cases, courts describe 
the evidence in a way that makes it nearly impossible to determine how the employer presented the 
evidence. 
 53. See cases discussed in previous footnote. 
 54. Baffa v. STAT Health Immediate Med. Care, P.C., No. 11-CV-4709 JFB GRB, 2013 WL 
5234231, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013) (affidavits from co-workers were also presented in the 
case). 
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disposition of the plaintiff. Thus, courts allow evidence that co-workers thought 
the plaintiff was “lazy,”55 “rude,”56 or used an “angry tone.”57 
At times, the way that the courts describe the co-worker evidence is so vague 
that it is not clear what evidence was submitted. Instead, the only thing that is 
clear is that the evidence supports the employer’s case and not the worker’s case. 
For example, in one case a plaintiff alleged that his employer terminated him in 
2000 because of his age and sex.58 The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. When doing so, the court 
noted that several unidentified former supervisors had noted the plaintiff’s poor 
performance since 1992.59 The court did not describe the evidence presented by 
the plaintiff, did not provide the names of the former supervisors, did not provide 
the substance of the former supervisors’ criticism, or discuss how plaintiff’s past 
performance issues related to the case before the court. 
Examples of the co-worker evidence upon which courts rely is helpful to 
understanding the evidentiary mismatch described in this article. The report and 
recommendation in Philpot v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, shows how a 
court will allow a defendant to use co-worker evidence of a plaintiff’s alleged 
poor performance from numerous co-workers, across a wide swath of time, and 
without explaining how the co-worker evidence relates to the contested 
employment action.60 Often the judge refers to the co-worker evidence in such 
a vague way that it is impossible to determine how the defendant presented the 
evidence and what the evidence actually showed. 
In Philpot, the plaintiff alleged that the employer fired her in 2006 because 
of her race and in retaliation for complaining about race discrimination.61 The 
magistrate judge recommended that the district court judge grant the employer’s 
motion for summary judgment. Without explaining why, the magistrate judge 
described plaintiff’s alleged performance problems beginning in 2002.62 The 
judge explained how two co-workers complained about the plaintiff’s conduct 
without explaining what the plaintiff allegedly had done or how it related to her 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Thome v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Greater Houston Area, 786 F. App’x 462, 463 
(5th Cir. 2019) (providing almost no details about complaint, other than conclusions that the 
plaintiff was rude and disrespectful); Kho v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., 344 F. Supp. 3d 705, 
715 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 57. Jeffrey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., No. CV 17-0531, 2019 WL 2122989, at 
*1 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2019). 
 58. Silver v. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 212 F. App’x 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Philpot v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, No. 1:07-CV-0657-RWS-LTW, 2008 WL 
11407269, at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2008), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:07-CV-0657-
RWS, 2008 WL 11407343 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2008). 
 61. Id. at *1. 
 62. Id. at *2. 
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termination.63 The judge continued by explaining problems that another person 
(Dr. Robert McCormack) had with the plaintiff’s written work product in 2003 
and 2004.64 In 2005, the employer changed the plaintiff’s job duties, along with 
the duties of other employees in her department. The employer presented 
evidence that the person who was responsible for reassigning the plaintiff’s job 
duties did so, in part, because of input from Dr. McCormack and another 
individual, but did not describe the substance of the input.65 The plaintiff 
complained that the reassignment was discriminatory.66 
The judge continued by explaining that another co-worker complained about 
the plaintiff’s conduct toward the co-worker. The judge did not identify the co-
worker, the substance of the co-worker’s complaint, or how it related to the 
plaintiff’s termination.67 The judge then recounted evidence of an audit of the 
plaintiff’s work completed by a co-worker and reported that the co-worker found 
the plaintiff’s work to be “poor.”68 The judge continued by describing other 
evidence of plaintiff’s performance deficiencies from her supervisor. The 
magistrate judge relied significantly on co-worker evidence to support the 
recommendation to grant summary judgment in favor of the employer. 
In Isbell v. Baxter Healthcare, Corp., the district court judge granted 
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim that she was terminated because she 
complained about harassment.69 The plaintiff contested the co-worker evidence 
offered by the defendant, arguing that it lacked a proper foundation. In granting 
summary judgment, the court relied on testimony from plaintiff’s supervisor. 
The supervisor testified that “sometime in 2013” another individual (Seema 
Sondhi) told the supervisor that Sondhi’s team members found meetings with 
the plaintiff to be “a waste of time” and “unproductive.”70 The supervisor was 
not able to report which team members felt this way but the supervisor could 
recall other general complaints from unspecified individuals.71 The supervisor 
also testified about a number of other more specific complaints, from a number 
of different co-workers.72 
Taken together, Philpot and Isbell show that courts allow employers to 
heavily rely on co-worker evidence related to the plaintiff’s job performance, 
even when the evidence is vague and comes from individuals who are not the 
plaintiff’s supervisor.  
 
 63. Id. at *2. 
 64. Id. at *3. 
 65. Philpot, No. 1:07-CV-0657-RWS-LTW, 2008 WL 11407269, at *3. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at *4. 
 68. Id. at *5. 
 69. 273 F. Supp. 3d 965, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 70. Id. at 971. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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B. Courts Often Exclude or Diminish Co-Worker Evidence 
In many discrimination issues, the plaintiff tries to counter the employer’s 
evidence by showing that the plaintiff did not engage in the alleged misconduct, 
that her work performance was good, or that she possessed the skills the 
employer claimed she lacked. One way that a plaintiff can establish pretext 
under the McDonnell Douglas framework is to show that the employer’s 
articulated reason is not credible.73 In discrimination cases, courts will often 
exclude or diminish the significance of plaintiff’s co-worker evidence. 
Courts routinely exclude or diminish plaintiff’s evidence from co-workers 
or former supervisors that the plaintiff performed her job well.74 This occurs 
even when the evidence of good performance is documented in the employer’s 
performance review records75 and when the evidence contains facts about why 
and how the plaintiff performed well.76 At times, courts refuse to consider 
evidence that a plaintiff has a long history of favorable performance under one 
supervisor and then faces immediate poor performance reviews by a new 
supervisor who is in a different protected class.77 Courts will prohibit the 
plaintiff from offering testimony from co-workers that the plaintiff was not 
 
 73. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). Lower courts have 
complicated the pretext doctrine. For additional coverage of this topic, see Sandra F. Sperino, 
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN DISCRIMINATION LAW, ch. 7 
(Bloomberg); Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 314 (2010); D. Wendy 
Greene, Pretext Without Context, 75 MO. L. REV. 403 (2010); 
The Honorable Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 503–04 
(2008). 
 74. See, e.g., Dinda v. CSC Gov’t Sols. LLC, No. 2:17-CV-03171-DCN, 2019 WL 3244186, 
at *5 (D.S.C. July 19, 2019); Lindeman v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City, 899 F.3d 603, 606–
07 (8th Cir. 2018) (diminishing importance of reviews by prior supervisors); Davis v. Nissan N. 
Am., Inc., 693 F. App’x 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding evidence of good job performance by the 
plaintiff is not relevant when it came from coworkers and former supervisors); Weinerth v. 
Martinsville City Sch. Bd., No. 4:17-CV-00067, 2019 WL 2181931, at *9 (W.D. Va. May 20, 2019) 
(review from prior supervisor was not relevant). 
 75. Bolton v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 220 F. App’x 761, 765 (10th Cir. 2007); Carroll v. 
Office Depot, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00414-AKK, 2015 WL 1487098, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2015). 
 76. Dinda v. CSC Gov’t Sols. LLC, No. 2:17-CV-03171-DCN, 2019 WL 3244186, at *5 
(D.S.C. July 19, 2019); see also Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) 
(rejecting argument that differences in performance evaluation establish pretext by emphasizing 
that “[d]ifferent supervisors may impose different standards of behavior, and a new supervisor may 
decide to enforce policies that a previous supervisor did not consider important”). 
 77. Carroll, No. 2:13-CV-00414-AKK, 2015 WL 1487098, at *1. But see Kelly v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., No. 2:11-CV-00193, 2012 WL 5467759, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2012) (allowing this kind 
of evidence). 
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responsible for performance issues claimed by the defendant or evidence about 
how well the plaintiff performed her job.78  
When co-worker evidence supports the plaintiff, courts often diminish it by 
labeling it as an “opinion”79 or as “irrelevant.”80 One court described plaintiffs’ 
co-worker evidence as “close to irrelevant” and as having no probative value.81 
At times, courts characterize the evidence presented by the plaintiff’s co-
workers as merely expressing their opinion about the plaintiff’s work 
performance, even when the evidence presented does more than express a 
general opinion.82  
In some cases, it is nearly impossible to tell what evidence the plaintiff 
actually offered because the courts only generally describe the evidence.83 For 
example, a court might state that the plaintiff submitted a co-worker’s “opinion” 
about the plaintiff’s performance without describing in detail who the co-worker 
is and the subject of the co-worker’s testimony.84 In one case, the Fourth Circuit 
held that the plaintiff could not try to support her claim that she performed her 
job well using “statements allegedly made by her co-workers.”85 The court did 
not describe what statements the co-workers made or in what format the plaintiff 
tried to present the co-worker evidence.  
In case after case, courts diminish the evidence of plaintiff’s good 
performance when that evidence comes from former supervisors and co-
workers.86  
Plaintiffs also have difficulty presenting evidence that the employer did not 
apply its procedures in the same way to people in different protected classes. In 
one case alleging race, age, and national origin discrimination case, a plaintiff 
provided affidavits from his former supervisor and former project manager.87 
 
 78. Martin v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 67 F. App’x 109, 113–14 (3d Cir. 2003); Anderson 
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994); Brenner v. City of New York Dep’t 
of Educ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 407, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 79. See, e.g., Brenner, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 419; McKinley v. Skyline Chili, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-
344, 2012 WL 3527222, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2012); Stevens v. Del Webb Communities, Inc., 
456 F. Supp. 2d 698, 729 (D.S.C. 2006). 
 80. Bart-Williams v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1:16-CV-1338-GBL-TCB, 2017 WL 4401463, 
at *10 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2017). 
 81. Davis v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 693 F. App’x 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 82. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124. 
 83. See, e.g., Davis, 693 F. App’x at 184 (describing plaintiff as presenting the “opinions” of 
his coworkers and former supervisors without otherwise describing the evidence). 
 84. See, e.g., Davis, 693 F. App’x at 184; Brice v. Joule Inc., 229 F.3d 1141 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 85. Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 86. Cornelius v. City of Columbia, No. CA 3:08-2508-CMC-PJG, 2010 WL 1258009, at *3 
n.9 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2010) (noting that evaluations from co-workers and former supervisors were 
not relevant); Frazier v. Doosan Infracore Int’l, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-0187-TCB-JFK, 2011 WL 
13161996, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:09-CV-
187-TCB, 2011 WL 13162052 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2011). 
 87. Abioye v. Sundstrand Corp., 164 F.3d 364, 368 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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The plaintiff claimed these affidavits demonstrated “the process utilized to 
evaluate his performance was different from the process used to evaluate white 
employees; that young, white engineers were brought in to replace him; that a 
white engineer had failed on a major project without reprimand; and that 
engineers in other groups received reassignment” when the plaintiff did not.88 
Without providing the text of the affidavits or even a general description of what 
information the affidavits conveyed, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial 
court’s decision to strike major portions of the affidavit. The court characterized 
portions of the affidavits as “merely conjecture based on rumor” and noted that 
these individuals could not speculate on the employer’s motives for taking an 
action.89 The district court opinion likewise contains almost no detail about the 
excluded material.90 
In co-worker evidence cases, it is common for courts to use language to try 
to diminish the plaintiff’s co-worker evidence. For example, in one case, a 
worker alleged that he was demoted based on his race.91 The plaintiff alleged 
that because he was black he was given less support and held to different 
performance standards than white employees.92 In support of his claim, he 
offered an affidavit from a co-worker stating that the person who demoted the 
plaintiff had called the co-worker a “n*****” at work.93 Despite this evidence, 
the court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The court 
diminished the co-worker affidavit by calling it “bare bones” and saying it 
consisted of one sentence “claiming that [the supervisor] called the coworker a 
‘n*****’ while both were at work.”94 However, given what the affidavit was 
trying to convey, it is unclear what else the affidavit needed to contain to be 
relevant. The court then stated that no inference of discrimination could be 
drawn in the plaintiff’s case from the co-worker evidence. 
C. Juxtaposing Cases 
The evidentiary inequality for co-worker evidence is easiest to see by 
juxtaposing how courts view similar co-worker evidence within the same case. 
These cases show that judges often routinely allow co-worker evidence to 
support the employer and do not allow the plaintiff to rely on similar evidence. 
In one case, Coleman v. Schneider Elec. USA, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that 
her employer refused to promote her because of race and sex.95 The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, and the Fourth Circuit 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Abioye, No. 96 C 50038, 1997 WL 795850, at *3, aff’d, 164 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 91. Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 292, 300 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 92. Id. at 300–01. 
 93. Id. at 302. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 755 F. App’x 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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affirmed the trial court in a per curiam opinion. The employer asserted that it did 
not promote the plaintiff to a trainer position because her communication skills 
were not sufficient. The Fourth Circuit described the co-worker evidence 
presented as follows: 
A former manager had previously informed Coleman that her communication 
skills needed improvement, and after working with Coleman, her new manager 
developed a similar opinion. While another former supervisor found that 
Coleman performed her training tasks adequately, the hiring manager was 
entitled to form a different opinion of Coleman’s capabilities.96 
As demonstrated by this passage, both the plaintiff and the defendant wanted to 
rely on inferences from the plaintiff’s former supervisor. Notice how the court 
treated the evidence. The evidence from a former supervisor that the plaintiff’s 
communication skills needed improvement bolstered the employer’s reason for 
refusing to promote the plaintiff, and the court appears to view that evidence 
favorably in support of the employer’s motion for summary judgment. However, 
the court diminished the evidence from another supervisor that the plaintiff has 
trained employees adequately in the past. The co-worker evidence that supports 
the employer is relevant and probative, but the contradictory evidence is not, 
with little explanation from the court.  
The way the court treated this evidence is especially surprising because the 
court appears to ignore another inference the plaintiff tried to draw. The plaintiff 
tried to show that she had trained employees in the past, but that the person who 
obtained the position did not have such experience.97 The plaintiff tried to argue 
that the employer hired a less qualified individual for the position by showing 
that she had training experience and the person selected did not. However, both 
the district court and the appellate court appear to ignore this argument, 
emphasizing a narrow concept of pretext. In the courts’ view, the only opinion 
that matters is the opinion of the decisionmaker, and the only co-worker 
evidence viewed favorably is evidence that supports the employer’s position. 
In Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the employer claimed that it fired 
the plaintiff after several performance related issues.98 The plaintiff presented 
evidence from a co-worker that these incidents were not the plaintiff’s fault and 
not his area of responsibility. Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit 
rejected this evidence as relevant to the plaintiff’s claim.99 However, in the same 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Coleman v. Schneider Elec. USA, Inc., No. CV 8:15-2466-HMH-KFM, 2018 WL 706333, 
at *8 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2018), aff’d, 755 F. App’x 247 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 98. 13 F.3d 1120, 1121 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 99. Id. at 1124–25; Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 90 C 6953, 1992 WL 233938, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1992). 
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case, the district court relied on evidence from the same co-worker that the 
plaintiff had other performance problems.100 
In another case, a plaintiff alleged that a police department refused to 
promote her into several positions because of her sex.101 The employer asserted 
that one of the reasons it did not promote the plaintiff is that her supervisors had 
concerns about her ability to supervise others.102 Strangely, the court noted that 
it was “undisputed” that the plaintiff did not possess the ability to supervise other 
employees well. Throughout the opinion, the court favorably described evidence 
from the plaintiff’s former supervisors about her lack of ability.103 However, the 
plaintiff presented evidence from a former supervisor and a subordinate 
indicating that the plaintiff worked well with others and attested to her ability to 
supervisor others.104 Without discussing this evidence in detail, the court simply 
noted that this evidence did not create a question of fact. 
Similarly, in Stevens v. Del Webb Communities, Inc. the plaintiff tried to 
offer evidence from co-workers that “she was pleasant” and was a “team player.” 
105 The court held that these co-workers’ opinions were not relevant to the case. 
However, in the very next paragraph, the court states that the plaintiff had 
performance problems and that these were evidenced by complaints from the 
plaintiff’s co-workers.106 The co-worker evidence that favored the plaintiff was 
irrelevant opinion, but the court treated the co-worker evidence that favored the 
employer as uncontested fact. 
IV.  A PATH FORWARD 
This Article demonstrates a propensity for courts to rely on co-worker 
evidence when it supports the employer and to exclude or diminish similar 
evidence when it supports the plaintiff. This section explores ways that courts 
can recognize the evidentiary inequality and implement mechanisms to prevent 
it from happening.  
As shown throughout this Article, it is not clear whether judges are aware 
of evidentiary inequality related to co-worker evidence. In many individual 
cases, this evidentiary inequality is relatively well hidden. In many cases, a judge 
is only evaluating co-worker evidence from the employer or the plaintiff. In 
these instances, it may be difficult for a judge to see the overall pattern.  
 
 100. Anderson, 1992 WL 233938, at *1 (the trial court refers to the same individual as a co-
worker and also a supervisor without noting the discrepancy). 
 101. Christy v. Myrtle Beach, No. 4:09-CV-1428-JMC-TER, 2011 WL 4808193, at *17 
(D.S.C. July 27, 2011), report and recommendation adopted in part, No. 4:09-CV-01428-JMC, 
2011 WL 4808264 (D.S.C. Oct. 11, 2011). 
 102. Id. at *14. 
 103. Id. at *2, *14. 
 104. Id. at *17. 
 105. 456 F. Supp. 2d 698, 729 (D.S.C. 2006). 
 106. Id. at 730. 
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There is no overarching evidentiary doctrine related to co-worker evidence. 
At times, no doctrine is at play, and the evidentiary equality only emerges by 
analyzing the conclusions courts draw about particular evidence offered by the 
parties. In other instances, courts exclude or include co-worker evidence through 
several doctrines, which facially appear to be disconnected. For example, courts 
sometimes dismiss co-worker evidence under evidentiary issues, such as hearsay 
or a lack of foundation.107 Courts also diminish or exclude co-worker evidence 
that favors the plaintiff by narrowly defining pretext or relevance.108 However, 
as discussed in Section II, the courts appear to apply these doctrines differently 
depending on whose case the co-worker evidence supports. Often, it is difficult 
to understand how the court is applying the doctrines because the court does not 
describe the plaintiff’s evidence in sufficient detail. 
However, after reviewing hundreds of cases, it is possible to identify several 
mechanisms that serve as tell-tale signs of evidentiary inequality related to co-
worker evidence. As discussed in Section III.B., courts often describe the 
plaintiff’s evidence in vague and conclusory ways. Each time a court does this, 
there is an opportunity to stop and reflect whether the conclusory label is 
warranted. One word that plays a large role in evidentiary inequality is the word 
“opinion.” Whenever a court indicates that co-worker evidence is merely an 
opinion, the court is often diminishing the evidence and making powerful 
judgments about the plaintiff’s evidence. Similarly, the same phenomenon often 
occurs when judges make sweeping statements about the plaintiff’s co-worker 
evidence without describing the actual evidence. For example, when a judge 
states that a plaintiff’s co-worker evidence is irrelevant, without discussing the 
evidence and why it lacks relevance, it is often a sign of evidentiary 
inequality.109 
These words are not universally a sign that something is amiss. There are 
times when the plaintiff submits evidence that is not admissible or relevant. The 
problems occur when judges make sweeping, categorical statements about all 
the evidence submitted from a particular person without describing the evidence.  
An example is helpful. Imagine that the plaintiff submits an affidavit from 
a co-worker. The affidavit simply states, “I believe the supervisor treated the 
plaintiff differently because of her sex.” The affidavit provides no further details. 
 
 107. Compare Ashley v. S. Tool Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1164 (N.D. Ala. 2002), aff’d, 62 
F. App’x 318 (11th Cir. 2003) (statements to employee by other workers was hearsay) with Bush 
v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 1998) (statements by co-workers to another 
individual that plaintiff was abusive and unstable were not hearsay); see also, e.g., Harrison v. 
Formosa Plastics Corp. Texas., 776 F. Supp. 2d 433, 441 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (expressing concerns 
about foundation and hearsay); Duncan v. Thorek Mem’l Hosp., 784 F. Supp. 2d 910, 921 (N.D. 
Ill. 2011) (discussing hearsay). 
 108. See, e.g., Davis v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 693 F. App’x 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 109. See id. (describing plaintiff as presenting the “opinions” of his coworkers and former 
supervisors without otherwise describing the evidence). 
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Such an affidavit is properly excluded because it is conclusory and does not 
convey how the affiant has personal knowledge about the material conveyed in 
the affidavit. However, a slightly different affidavit could not properly be 
construed as merely an opinion. If the affidavit contains the factual basis for the 
belief, along with why the affiant possesses personal knowledge of those facts, 
then the judge cannot properly dismiss the affidavit as conclusory or merely an 
opinion. The summary judgment standard demands that judges distinguish the 
first kind of affidavit from the second. Both plaintiffs and defendants deserve 
for courts to consider their evidence seriously. This does not occur when a court 
simply labels evidence as an “opinion” or as “vague,” without documenting why 
those labels are warranted. These labels serve as a tell-tale sign of evidentiary 
inequality. 
Another way to identify evidentiary inequality is to look for categorical 
statements about certain kinds of evidence. Many courts reason that evidence 
from co-workers and former supervisors are never relevant to establishing a 
plaintiff’s claim.110 For example, one court noted, “feedback from coworkers 
and third parties is irrelevant if those individuals were not the decision makers 
in an employee’s termination.”111 However, such statements sweep too broadly 
and exclude too much of the plaintiff’s evidence.  
Employment discrimination claims are highly contextual, and the Supreme 
Court has reiterated on multiple occasions that context matters.112 It is correct 
that in some cases, evidence from a co-worker is not sufficient standing alone to 
allow the case to proceed to trial. Imagine a case where the employer presents 
evidence that it fired the plaintiff after a series of documented problems with the 
plaintiff’s work performance and multiple people testify that the plaintiff 
engaged in misconduct. The plaintiff presents one affidavit from a co-worker in 
a different department that simply states the co-worker’s subjective belief that 
the plaintiff’s work was “good.” This case should not proceed to a jury trial, but 
the reason why has very little to do with the fact that the affidavit is offered by 
a co-worker. Given these facts, no reasonable jury could find discrimination. 
 
 110. Frazier v. Doosan Infracore Int’l, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-0187-TCB-JFK, 2011 WL 13161996, 
at *14 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:09-CV-187-TCB, 2011 
WL 13162052 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2011). 
 111. Many statements courts make about co-worker evidence reflect a narrow framing of the 
pretext inquiry in the McDonnell Douglas framework. This topic is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Bart-Williams v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1:16-CV-1338-GBL-TCB, 2017 WL 4401463, at *11 
(E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2017).  
 112. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) (stating the “real 
social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words 
used or the physical acts performed”); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 
U.S. 53, 69 (2006); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000) (analyzing 
the facts in detail). 
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However, slight changes in the facts should lead to a different result. 
Imagine that a sixty-year old plaintiff gets a new thirty-year old supervisor. The 
supervisor fires the plaintiff after the supervisor claims the plaintiff made one 
relatively minor mistake. The worker files an age discrimination claim, and the 
employer moves for summary judgment. Three younger co-workers provide 
affidavits that the plaintiff’s work performance was excellent and that she did 
not make the mistake claimed by the supervisor. Even though the plaintiff is 
relying on co-worker evidence, the court should deny the employer’s motion for 
summary judgment in this case. The plaintiff is relying on several inferences to 
establish her case: the age difference between the plaintiff and the new 
supervisor, the supervisor firing the plaintiff for a relatively minor problem, and 
the supervisor accusing the plaintiff of making a mistake when there is evidence 
that she did not. All this evidence works together to make the case strong enough 
that a factfinder might find in favor of the plaintiff. A categorical rule 
diminishing or excluding co-worker evidence misses the many ways that co-
worker evidence can properly support a plaintiff’s claim. 
Categorical rules and conclusory labels provide courts with a way of 
recognizing potential evidentiary inequality. On an individual basis, judges can 
use these signs to self-police instances where they might be treating evidence 
unequally. However, the judiciary can also engage in a more collective effort. 
The judiciary can adopt statement rules to address evidentiary inequality. 
The statement rule would identify the propensity to undervalue plaintiffs’ co-
worker evidence and require judges to reflect on whether they are 
inappropriately excluding or diminishing this evidence. The statement rule 
would reiterate the appropriate legal standard at the summary judgment stage 
and emphasize that the summary judgment standard relates to fundamental 
principles like the right to a jury trial. In federal court, Rule 56 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides a mechanism for effectuating the plaintiff’s 
right to a jury trial, while also allowing the courts to filter out claims that a jury 
would never find to be successful.113 
The statement rule would remind judges that context matters and that there 
is no reason to summarily exclude a plaintiff’s co-worker evidence. It would 
encourage a court to review all of the plaintiff’s evidence in light of the summary 
judgment standard. The rule also should require the court to explain, in detail, 
the evidence offered by the plaintiff and discourage the trial court from using 
conclusory labels. 
 
 113. This is an idealized view of summary judgment. There is a large body of scholarly 
literature critiquing the way that judges rule on summary judgment motions. See, e.g., Suja A. 
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007); see generally 
Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The 
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 206–07 
(1993). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In discrimination cases, courts regularly rely on co-worker evidence that 
supports the employer and regularly diminish co-worker evidence that supports 
the plaintiff. This Article identifies this evidentiary inequality and calls for 
courts to guard against it. This call is especially important given the broader 
themes of this symposium relating to new forms of worker empowerment. 





 114. For a comprehensive discussion of the role co-workers play in supporting one another see 
Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards A Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 605, 607 (2017). 
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